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Do Graphic Tobacco Warnings
Violate the First Amendment?
Nathan Cortez*
When Congress passed the nation’s first comprehensive tobacco bill in 2009, it replaced
the familiar Surgeon General’s warnings, last updated in 1984, with nine blunter
warnings. The law also directed the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to
require color graphics to accompany the textual warnings. By law, the warnings would
cover the top fifty percent of the front and back of tobacco packaging and the top twenty
percent of print advertisements, bringing the United States closer to many peer countries
that now require graphic warnings. Tobacco companies challenged the requirement on
First Amendment grounds, arguing that the compelled disclosures violated their free
speech rights. In 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the challenge as a facial
attack and upheld the law in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States; five
months later, the D.C. Circuit vacated the graphic warnings selected in the FDA’s final
rule in R.J. Reynolds v. FDA. Although many expected the Supreme Court to resolve the
apparent circuit split, the government withdrew the rule and opposed Supreme Court
review. As such, the FDA will reinitiate the lumbering rulemaking process and propose
new graphic warnings. And when it does, the tobacco industry most likely will challenge
the graphic warnings again on First Amendment grounds. This Article considers several
ambiguities that these cases have left unresolved and suggests how the FDA and courts
should confront these questions during the next round of rulemaking and litigation. The
Supreme Court will probably have another chance to resolve these ambiguities and its
decision could have significant consequences for future government efforts to catch our
attention at the point of sale.

* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. J.D., Stanford
Law School; B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I thank Natalie Stewart Cortez for commenting on
earlier drafts. Before entering academia, I advised Philip Morris and its parent company, Altria, on
matters related to FDA regulation. The views in this Article are my own.
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Introduction
After two centuries of non-regulation and another four decades of
piecemeal oversight, Congress in 2009 passed the first comprehensive
tobacco legislation, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
1
Control Act. The Act requires tobacco companies to rotate nine written
warnings on their packaging and advertisements and directs the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to issue regulations that “require color
2
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking.”
The stakes are familiar but striking. Tobacco use kills “more than
400,000 Americans every yearmore deaths than from AIDS, alcohol,
3
car accidents, murders, suicides, drugs, and fires combined.” Adult
4
smokers overwhelmingly adopt the habit as adolescents. Every day, 1500
children under eighteen years of age become regular smokers, of whom
5
“about half eventually will die from a disease caused by tobacco use.”
In response, Congress mandated nine new written warnings and
6
directed the FDA to select images to accompany them. By law, the

1. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–87u (2009)).
2. Id. § 201(d).
3. Suzanne H. Reuben, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., President’s Cancer Panel,
Promoting Healthy Lifestyles: Policy, Program, and Personal Recommendations for Reducing
Cancer Risk 61 (2007).
4. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
5. Reuben, supra note 3, at 64.
6. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 201(d), 123 Stat. 1842, 1845 (2009)
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warnings must occupy the top fifty percent of the front and back of
7
tobacco packaging and twenty percent of print ads. The FDA selected the
8
following nine warnings:
Figure 1: FDA-Selected Graphic Tobacco Warnings

Tobacco companies promptly challenged these warnings on First
Amendment grounds, arguing that the compelled disclosures violate their
free speech rights. The companies first filed suit in the Western District of
9
10
Kentucky and then in the District of Columbia. Appeals from these cases
generated disparate rulings on graphic warnings. In March 2012, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld graphic warnings in Discount Tobacco
11
City & Lottery v. United States. Five months later, the D.C. Circuit
invalidated the graphic warnings selected by the FDA in R.J. Reynolds
12
Tobacco Co. v. FDA.

(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2009)).
7. Id. § 201(a)(2).
8. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,629
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
9. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
10. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
11. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
12. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (denying rehearing en banc).
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Tobacco companies petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn the
13
14
Sixth Circuit ruling and most expected the Court to grant certiorari.
But before it could do so, the FDA both withdrew its proposed rule and
decided against appealing the D.C. Circuit’s decision. As a result, the
Department of Justice urged the Court to deny certiorari in the Sixth
Circuit case in March 2013, arguing that the FDA’s action rendered the
15
case moot and that it no longer presented an inter-circuit conflict. The
FDA informed the Department of Justice that it would “undertake
research necessary to support a new rulemaking consistent with the Act
16
and the First Amendment.”
The FDA’s removal was a strategic step to avoid a Supreme Court
17
that has aggressively protected corporate speech. The decision not to
appeal R.J. Reynolds marks the second major recent case in which the
FDA has decided not to appeal a circuit court decision limiting its
18
authority on First Amendment grounds. But the cost of letting R.J.
Reynolds stand will be years of research to support more years of
rulemaking—followed most likely by even more years of litigation.
In the meantime, several unresolved legal questions on graphic
warnings linger. This Article examines them as the parties prepare for
another round of rulemaking and, most likely, another round of litigation.
Given the unresolved ambiguities, the Supreme Court may yet have
another chance to resolve these issues.
Graphic warnings are governed by the First Amendment’s
19
20
commercial speech doctrine, which itself is not yet four decades old. As
the law on commercial speech has developed, courts have focused largely

13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 2013 WL 1704718 (Apr. 22, 2013)
(No. 12-521), 2012 WL 5353900.
14. See, e.g., Ronald Bayer et al., Repackaging Cigarettes—Will the Courts Thwart the FDA?,
367 New Eng. J. Med. 2065 (2012).
15. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Am. Snuff Co., 2013 WL 1704718 (No. 12-521), 2013
WL 1209163, at *17.
16. Id. at *16.
17. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom: The Roberts Court, the First Amendment,
and the New Absolutism, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 409 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the
Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 581 (2011) (addressing First Amendment limits on campaign
finance law).
18. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), is the other case. Caronia overturned a
sales representative’s conviction for misbranding under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
under Central Hudson because it punished his speech. Id. at 168.
19. See generally Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 539 (2012) (discussing the government
compelling speech including graphic warnings).
20. Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 37 Am. J.L. &
Med. 388, 388 (2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court reversed its longstanding position that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech [in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)].”).
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on restrictions on speech. Despite the prevalence of compelled commercial
21
disclosures, courts have said very little about them. In 1985, the Supreme
Court first established a test for mandatory commercial disclosures in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which upheld disclosures
22
required for certain types of attorney advertising. But the Court has not
23
updated Zauderer in nearly thirty years. It has applied Zauderer only
24
25
twice since 1985 and addressed it briefly in only three other cases. The
dearth of cases (and thus doctrine) provides ample room for the
Supreme Court to elaborate on the law governing mandated commercial
disclosures.
During the next round of rulemaking and litigation, the FDA and
courts must confront five fascinating but difficult questions: First, what
standard of review applies to graphic warnings? Must the Court apply
26
rational basis review under Zauderer because this problem involves
mandatory commercial disclosures? Or is it more appropriate to apply
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
27
Public Services Commission, which traditionally applies to restrictions
on commercial speech? Or should the Court craft a unique standard for
28
29
graphic warnings? Both the Sixth and the D.C. Circuits have
concentrated on locating the appropriate standard of review, which itself
required determining whether Zauderer’s friendlier standard could
accommodate different state interests (for example, protecting public
health rather than preventing consumer deception).
Second, to answer the first question, both the FDA and the courts will
have to confront another subsidiary question: Were the graphic warnings
that the FDA selected factual? Zauderer addresses itself to disclosures of

21. Keighley, supra note 19, at 541.
22. 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 (1985).
23. Keighley, supra note 19, at 541.
24. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, *1339–41 (2010) (applying
Zauderer to uphold a requirement under the Bankruptcy Code that advertisements for debt relief
services must also disclose that the services essentially help clients file for bankruptcy); Ibanez v. Fl.
Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1994) (applying principles from Zauderer, but
finding that the Board of Accountancy violated the commercial speech rights of an attorney when it
censured her for truthfully advertising her accounting and financial planning credentials).
25. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 416 (2001) (declining to apply Zauderer in
striking down a law that required mushroom growers to fund generic advertisements for mushrooms);
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 490–91 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Zauderer should be limited to mandated disclosures that are intended to prevent consumer
deception); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (declining to apply
Zauderer to a requirement by a state agency that utility companies include a third party’s newsletter in
its billing envelopes).
26. 471 U.S. at 638–42.
27. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
28. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
29. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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30

“purely factual and uncontroversial information.” Do emotionally salient
graphic warnings fit this criterion? Or are they nonfactual, or at least
factually controversial?
Third, the FDA and the courts will need to consider whether graphic
warnings necessarily appeal to our emotions, rather than to our minds, and
whether this matters for First Amendment purposes. Are images
categorically distinct from text under the commercial speech doctrine?
And can the government use consumer product packaging to appeal to our
hearts and not just our minds? When speaking on private packaging, is the
government limited to statements of fact? And what if facts are
emotionally salient (or even troubling)?
Fourth, will the First Amendment rights of marketers give way to
the core value that animates commercial speech doctrineensuring “the
31
free flow of commercial information”? The Supreme Court in Zauderer
stressed that the marketer’s “interest in not providing any particular
32
factual information in his advertising is minimal.” Will the Court
preferas it has in other commercial speech cases“more disclosure,
33
rather than less”? Which priority gives way, given the immense public
health dimension here?
Finally, will the courts anticipate the next generation of disclosure
laws? If the Supreme Court were to invalidate the FDA’s graphic tobacco
warnings, it would implicate few, if any, existing disclosure laws. Such a
decision would not, most likely, overturn decades or even years of
34
congressional enactments. Rather, a decision striking down the first
serious attempt to catch our attention with mandatory graphic warnings
would freeze such disclosure laws in time. As society grows more numb to
bland, black-and-white textual warnings, the government’s hands would
become tied. If the government cannot use graphics to warn about the
risks of tobacco usewhich for decades has been one of our most pressing
public health problemsthen what would justify graphic warnings for less
urgent problems?
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I maps the long trajectory
of tobacco regulation, placing both the 2009 Act and the recent First
Amendment litigation in context. Part II identifies several fault lines that
both the FDA and the courts must confront during the next round of

30. 471 U.S. at 626.
31. Id. at 646.
32. Id. at 651.
33. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977).
34. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the “Court today rejects a century of history” in striking down federal campaign finance laws);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959–60 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that striking down the
legislative veto might invalidate “literally hundreds of statutes, dating back to the 1930s”).
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rulemaking and litigation. Part III evaluates the five questions posed
above and suggests how courts should answer them if given the chance.

I. The Long Trajectory of Tobacco Regulation
After two decades of intense litigation, legislation, and regulation,
one could believe that the tobacco industry finally has had its
comeuppance. For example, one might recall the multi-state tobacco
35
litigation of the 1990s. Or one might remember the moment when chief
executives from the seven major tobacco companies testified under oath
36
before Congress that nicotine was not addictive. Others might think of
the 1996 interview on 60 Minutes with the Brown & Williamson
37
whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand, or perhaps remember the movie based on
38
that interview, The Insider. Still others might recall one of the most
important Supreme Court decisions of that era, FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Corp., a weighty opinion on the relative authority of the
39
legislative and executive branches. By the time the satiric film Thank You
for Smoking was released in 2006, the industry was depicted as
40
beleaguered by the media, by Congress, and by the courts.
Despite the recent media attention and tobacco litigation, the tobacco
industry went largely unregulated in the United States for almost two full
41
centuries, until Congress passed the first federal anti-smoking law in 1965.
Looking back, the nation’s earliest experiences with tobacco
portended today’s public health battles. For example, Christopher
Columbus triggered controversy over the health risks of tobacco when he
42
brought the crop back to Europe from the new world in 1492. In 1604,
King James I of England declared smoking to be “a custom loathsome to
the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the brain, [and] dangerous to the
43
lung.” New Haven (in what was then the colony of Connecticut) adopted

35. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 63, 71–75 (1997).
36. Regulation of Tobacco Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 1–149 (1994).
37. See Jeffrey Wigand, Ph.D., 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 1996).
38. See The Insider (Touchstone Pictures 1999).
39. See 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
40. See Thank You for Smoking (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2006). The novel upon which the
movie was based was written in 1994. See Christopher Buckley, Thank You for Smoking (1994)
(depicting a fictional tobacco industry lobbyist Nick Naylor).
41. Theodore W. Ruger, The Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency
Continuity, in Statutory Interpretation Stories 334, 337–39 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al. eds., 2011).
42. Eric Burns, The Smoke of the Gods: A Social History of Tobacco 14–19 (2007); Ruger,
supra note 41, at 338.
43. Ruger, supra note 41, at 338 (alteration in original) (quoting Allan M. Brandt, The
Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall and Deadly Persistence of the Product That Defined
America 21 (2007)).
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the first anti-smoking law in America in 1646, which imposed a six-pence
44
penalty for each instance of smoking in public.
Our founding fathers even debated smoking: In 1794, Benjamin
Franklin and Alexander Hamilton opposed smoking and “supported a
hefty tobacco tax as an early federal revenue-raising and behavior-altering
measure,” but James Madison (of tobacco-producing Virginia) vigorously
45
opposed the measure. Of course, tobacco grew gradually in economic
importance over the next several decades, particularly in the southern
46
states.
A century and a half later, tobacco use peaked at nearly sixty
47
percent of American men in 1955. By 1965, the percentage of American
48
women who smoked peaked at thirty-four percent. That same year,
Congress passed the first federal law regulating tobacco products, the
49
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. The law
introduced the now-familiar, weakly worded warning: “Caution: Cigarette
50
Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”
The 1965 Act was the first of six major laws passed by Congress
51
addressing tobacco products. Just four years later, Congress passed the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which banned television and
radio ads of tobacco products and strengthened the standard warning to
read: “Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Smoking Is
52
Dangerous to Your Health.”
In 1983, Congress passed the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments,
which required the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
53
research the health effects of smoking. In 1984, Congress again modified
tobacco warning labels pursuant to the Comprehensive Smoking
54
Education Act the last such modification until 2009. The 1984 Act
required cigarette packages and advertising to rotate four different
warnings, which also became familiar:

44. Burns, supra note 42, at 101; Ruger, supra note 41, at 338.
45. Ruger, supra note 41, at 339.
46. Id. at 339–40.
47. Id. at 340.
48. Id. (citing Steven A. Schroeder, We Can Do BetterImproving the Health of the American
People, 357 New Eng. J. Med 1221, 1222 (2007)).
49. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
50. Id. at 283.
51. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012)
(recounting a brief history of tobacco legislation). Congress has passed several other, minor laws touching
on tobacco. See Selected Actions of the U.S. Government Regarding the Regulation of Tobacco Sales,
Marketing, and Use, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/data_statistics/by_topic/policy/legislation/index.htm.
52. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970).
53. Pub. L. No. 98-24, 97 Stat. 175 (1983).
54. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
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SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung
Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now
Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant
Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth
Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains
55
Carbon Monoxide.

The tobacco industry never challenged these mandated warnings on First
56
Amendment grounds.
In 1986, Congress extended warnings to smokeless tobacco packages
and ads and vested the Federal Trade Commission with enforcement
57
authority. In 1992, Congress passed another federal statute to encourage
58
states to better enforce the age restrictions on tobacco sales.
Thus between 1965 and 1986, Congress passed six major bills
regulating tobacco. Due to successful lobbying by the industry, however,
59
these bills were neither comprehensive nor very burdensome. During this
period, tobacco companies enjoyed unprecedented success in court, as
“more than three hundred lawsuits filed in the thirty years before 1980
60
61
resulted in not a single plaintiff’s verdict.” That record stood until 1997.
Yet by the early 1990s, evidence had accumulated that tobacco use
was our nation’s most significant public health concern. Between 1992
and 1995, the FDA investigated tobacco industry practices and built a
case toward asserting jurisdiction over nicotine as a “drug” and cigarettes
62
as drug-delivery “devices.” Emboldened by media exposés and waves of
lawsuits, the FDA began to gather previously confidential internal
corporate documents showing that tobacco companies were manipulating
63
the nicotine content of cigarettes to amplify their addictiveness.

55. Id. at 2201–02, § 4(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2009)).
56. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011).
57. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act, Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986).
58. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No.
102–321, 106 Stat. 323, 394 (1992).
59. Ruger, supra note 41, at 340–41.
60. Id. at 341. Indeed, Donald Garner’s 1980 article observed that the “automobile, drug, and
machine tool industries, as well as various consumer product industries, have all been held liable for
injuries associated with their dangerous products; only the tobacco industry can boast of defeating
every attempt to hold it accountable for injuries caused by its product.” Donald W. Garner, Cigarette
Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1423, 1423–24 (1980).
61. George J. Annas, Tobacco Litigation as Cancer Prevention: Dealing with the Devil, 336 New
Eng. J. Med. 304, 304–09 (1997); Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public
Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 769, 770 (1999).
62. Ruger, supra note 41, at 345–48.
63. Id. at 348–49.
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Buoyed by this evidence, the FDA proposed a rule in August 1995
that would have regulated the sale, distribution, and marketing of tobacco
64
products. During the public comment period, the agency received over
65
710,000 comments, more than “at any other time in its history on any
66
67
other subject.” A year later, the agency published its final rule.
The FDA’s efforts were quickly challenged in federal court and
were ultimately struck down in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
68
Corp. In a narrow 5–4 decision, the majority held that even the broad
language of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act could not justify
69
FDA jurisdiction over tobacco without specific congressional authority.
That authority finally came in 2009, when the 111th Congress passed
70
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Act”),
71
the first comprehensive legislation regulating tobacco. Similar bills had
failed in previous congresses, including the 110th Congress in 2008, when
72
the House passed legislation but it was not taken up by the Senate. The
bill only became law after President Barack Obama won the 2008
presidential election and Democrats won majorities in both the House and
73
the Senate.

64. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (proposed Aug. 11, 1995).
65. Ruger, supra note 41, at 352.
66. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
67. See id. at 44,396.
68. 529 U.S. 120, 130 (2000).
69. Id. at 159–60.
70. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–87u (2009)) (adding a
new Chapter 9 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and creating a new Center for Tobacco
Products within the FDA).
71. The 2009 Act directed the FDA to reissue the regulations that were invalidated by the
Supreme Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson. Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 102(a)(2) (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 387a-1 (2009)).
72. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, H.R. 1108, 110th Cong. (2008). Late in
the summer of 2008, the House passed H.R. 1108 by a vote of 326–102. 154 Cong. Rec. H7577 (July
30, 2008). The Senate became preoccupied with the emerging worldwide financial crisis and never
took up the bill. S. 625, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2008); 154 Cong. Rec. S8033 (Aug. 1, 2008). Yet, even
without the financial crisis, passage of H.R. 1108 was not guaranteed because President George W.
Bush had threatened a veto. Jacob Goldstein, Bush Administration Opposes FDA Regulation of
Tobacco, Wall St. J. Health Blog (July 23, 2008, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/07/23/
bush-administration-opposes-fda-regulation-of-tobacco. The tobacco industry was surprisingly divided
on the bill, with market share leader Philip Morris favoring the bill and all of its smaller competitors
opposing it. Id.
73. The final votes in the House and Senate were conclusive: H.R. 1256 passed the House 298–
112, and the Senate 79–17. 155 Cong. Rec. H4414–15 (Apr. 2, 2009); 155 Cong. Rec. S6501 (June 11,
2009). The House then agreed to the Senate’s amendments 307–97. 155 Cong. Rec. H6660 (June 12,
2009).
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The 2009 Act authorized the FDA to regulate how tobacco products
74
are manufactured, marketed, and sold. Although tobacco companies
75
challenged other requirements imposed by the Act, the First
Amendment controversy centered largely on the new graphic warnings.
Section 201 of the Act requires tobacco packaging and advertising to
76
rotate nine newer, more graphic, and less verbose written warnings. It
requires these warnings to occupy the top fifty percent of the front and
back of tobacco product packaging and twenty percent of the area on print
77
advertisements. Section 201 also requires the FDA to “issue regulations
that require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of
78
smoking to accompany” these nine textual warnings. The FDA proposed
79
thirty-six graphic images in its proposed rule, settling on nine in its June
80
2011 final rule. The nine warnings are as follows:
WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive. [Showing a man holding a
cigarette and exhaling smoke from a tracheostomy hole in his throat.]
WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children. [Showing a
mother holding a baby surrounded by smoke.]
WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease. [Showing healthy,
pink lungs next to diseased, yellowish lungs.]
WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer. [Showing a diseased mouth with
browning teeth and an open wound on the lower lip.]
WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease. [Showing a
man laying back, breathing through an oxygen mask with a resuscitator
bag.]
WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby.
[Showing a cartoon illustration of an infant crying in an incubator,
hooked up to a breathing tube and monitors.]
WARNING: Smoking can kill you. [Showing the head and chest of a
dead male, apparently lying on an autopsy table, with surgical staples
holding together a long, closed incision running down the middle of his
chest.]
WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.
[Showing an adult woman sobbing.]

74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–87u (2009); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–41 (2009) (scattered sections).
75. See, e.g., Lorillard, Inc. v. FDA, No. 11-440 (RJL), 2012 WL 3542228 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2012)
(challenging the composition of the FDA’s Tobacco Product Scientific Advisory Committee); Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (challenging several aspects
of the law).
76. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201, 123 Stat.
1842 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2009)).
77. Id. § 201(a).
78. Id. § 201(d).
79. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,534
(proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
80. Cigarette Package and Advertising Warnings, 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012).
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WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to
your health. [Showing an adult man wearing a t-shirt with a “No
81
Smoking” symbol and the words “I QUIT.”]

Each of these graphics also includes the phone number 1-800-QUITNOW, the number for the National Cancer Institute’s smoking cessation
82
hotline.
President Obama signed the Act on June 22, 2009. As with the FDA’s
doomed rulemaking effort in 1996, tobacco companies immediately sued
83
to challenge the new law. On August 31, 2009, five tobacco
manufacturers and sellers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
84
Western District of Kentucky. In January 2010, the court held that the
85
graphic images did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The
plaintiffs then appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Five tobacco companies—including three of the five plaintiffs in the
earlier case—filed a similar challenge in the federal district court for the
District of Columbia in August 2011, one month after oral argument in
86
87
the Sixth Circuit case and two months after the FDA’s final rule. In
November 2011, the D.C. district court enjoined the FDA’s regulations
88
from taking effect and later ruled for the tobacco companies on
89
summary judgment. The government appealed.
II. A Circuit Split?
In 2012, the Sixth Circuit and D.C. Circuit published seemingly
disparate opinions on whether graphic warnings violate the First
Amendment. In March of that year, the Sixth Circuit upheld the FDA’s
authority in Discount Tobacco City & Lottery; in August, the D.C. Circuit
90
struck down the graphic warnings rule in R.J. Reynolds. Both decisions
were divided. And both turned on the appropriate standard of review.
81. Cigarette Health Warnings, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
TobaccoProducts/Labeling/UCM259401.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
82. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg 36628, 36,681
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
83. Note that Altria, the parent company of Philip Morris, was not party to these suits.
84. See generally Complaint, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-00117). The five companies that joined this suit were Discount Tobacco
City & Lottery, Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Co., National Tobacco Co., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Commonwealth Brands, Inc., and American Snuff Co. (formerly Conwood Co.).
85. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
86. See generally Complaint, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39 (D.D.C.
2011) (No. 1:11-CV-01482). The five companies joining this suit were R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co., Commonwealth Brands, Inc., Liggett Group L.L.C., and Santa Fe Natural
Tobacco Co.
87. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628.
88. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39 (D.D.C. 2011).
89. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 268 (D.D.C. 2012).
90. Id. The D.C. Circuit denied a request to rehear the case en banc on December 5, 2012.
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A. The Sixth Circuit Upholds Graphic Warnings
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first appellate court
ruling on graphic tobacco warnings, upholding them in a 2–1 divided
91
opinion. Judge Stranch wrote for the majority, joined by Judge Barrett;
92
Judge Clay wrote in dissent. Both opinions consider the appropriate
93
standard of review at length. The three judges agreed that commercial
speech doctrine applies rather than the stricter scrutiny afforded to
94
noncommercial speech, as the industry argued.
The majority chose between Zauderer’s rational basis test and the
strict scrutiny standard for compelled noncommercial speech in Wooley
95
v. Maynard and discarded Central Hudson as an option. Judge Clay’s
dissent contemplated Zauderer and Central Hudson, without addressing
96
Wooley.
It is worth nothing that for more than thirty years, the Supreme
97
Court’s 1980 Central Hudson decision provided the default standard in
commercial speech cases. Central Hudson Gas and Electric, an electric
utility, challenged an order by the New York Public Service Commission
that banned all advertising by utilities that “promot[e] the use of
98
electricity.” The Court struck down the rule as violating the utility’s First
Amendment rights, establishing the famous three-step test that has been
99
used in hundreds of federal cases.
The Supreme Court has said very little about compelled speech and
even less about compelled commercial speech. Perhaps for this reason,
the Sixth Circuit majority cites Wooley v. Maynard, a 1977 Supreme
100
Court opinion. Disregarding Wooley seems apt, however, as the case
involved core religious speech, not commercial speech. In Wooley, the
91. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 551–69 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). On the graphic warnings issue, Judge Stranch wrote
the majority opinion, joined by Judge Barrett; Judge Clay’s opinion constitutes the dissent on that
issue. Id. at 517–18.
92. Id. at 524–31 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 521–27; id. at 554–61 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
94. Judge Clay’s dissent rejected the industry’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply because
the graphic warnings attempt “to convert commercial speakers into [the government’s] mouthpiece for
a subjective and highly controversial marketing campaign expressing its disapproval of their lawful
products.” Id. at 525 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)).
95. Id. at 554–61 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. Id. at 524–31 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
97. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
98. Id. at 558–59.
99. The first step asks whether the speech is false or misleading. Id. at 564. If it is not, the second
step asks whether the restriction on speech advances a substantial government interest. Id. Third, the
restriction “must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal,” meaning it “directly advances” the
state interest, and is not more restrictive than necessary. Id.
100. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 554 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)).
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plaintiff was a Jehovah’s Witness who objected to a New Hampshire
requirement that license plates bear the state motto “Live Free or Die,”
which the plaintiff found “morally, ethically, religiously and politically
101
abhorrent.” The Court prohibited the government from punishing
102
citizens like George Maynard who covered up the state motto.
It was not until 1985 that the Supreme Court set a standard for
compelled commercial disclosures. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, the Supreme Court upheld a state rule of professional conduct
that required attorneys who advertised contingency fee arrangements to
disclose that even unsuccessful litigants would have to pay certain court
103
fees and litigation expenses. The Court declared that “an advertiser’s
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
104
consumers.” The Zauderer opinion emphasizes three considerations that
are important for the graphic tobacco warnings litigation. First, it readily
105
distinguishes Wooley and other cases involving noncommercial speech.
Second, it observes that the purpose of extending First Amendment
protection to commercial speech is to inform consumersa marketer’s
“interest in not providing any particular factual information in his
106
advertising is minimal.” Finally, Zauderer rejects the “least restrictive
107
means” analysis from Central Hudson.
In Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, the Sixth Circuit majority
applied Zauderer because it found that the warnings represented fact, not
108
opinion. Judge Stranch’s decision emphasized first that the textual
warnings are factual beyond dispute: “It is beyond cavil that smoking
109
presents the serious health risks described in the warnings . . . .” Second,
she argued that because the Act requires the FDA to select color graphics
to depict the textual warnings, and because the challenge is necessarily a
facial one (predating the FDA’s proposed graphic warnings), the industry
“would have to establish that a graphic warning cannot convey the
negative health consequences of smoking accurately, a position
tantamount to concluding that pictures can never be factually accurate,

101. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713.
102. Id.
103. 471 U.S. 626, 636 (1985).
104. Id. at 651.
105. Id. (“Ohio has not attempted to prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion . . . . The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 651 n.14.
108. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 555–58 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 558.
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110

only written statements can be.” She stressed that this argument is “at
111
odds with reason.” Judge Stranch then described several graphic images
that would constitute factual disclosures of the risks of smoking under
Zauderer, some of which seem to be taken from the FDA’s proposed
112
rule.
Judge Stranch also carefully distinguished graphic tobacco warnings
from the Illinois law in Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
which required “sexually explicit” video games to be labeled with a large
113
sticker (“18”) reflecting the minimum age required to purchase them.
114
The Seventh Circuit in Blagojevich applied strict scrutiny. To Judge
Stranch, the case is distinguishable because opinions might reasonably
differ as to what video games qualify as “sexually explicit,” depending on
“personal taste and sexual morals,” but the health risks of smoking are
fact, not opinion: “The health risks of smoking tobacco have been
uncovered through scientific study. They are facts. Warnings about these
115
riskswhether textual or graphiccan communicate these facts.”
Thus, the Sixth Circuit majority applied Zauderer. Although Zauderer
is almost thirty years old, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its basic principles
in 2010 in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, which
116
considered a law that required a disclaimer in debt relief ads. The Court
in Milavetz applied Zauderer rather than Central Hudson for reasons that
parallel the tobacco case: The disclosure counters misleading claims, the
disclosure is factually accurate, and the disclosure does not prevent the
117
marketer from communicating its own additional information.
In his dissent, Judge Clay lingered on the distinction between
Central Hudson, which governs restrictions on truthful, non-misleading
118
commercial speech, and Zauderer, which governs mandated disclosures
119
intended to prevent consumer deception. Zauderer applies, he argued,
because tobacco companies have long marketed “the alleged pleasures
or satisfactions of cigarette smoking” and so “must also disclose the
120
serious risks to life that smoking involves.”

110. Id. at 558–59. Indeed, a contrary conclusion would read like a particularly bad analogy on the
SAT college entrance exam (Text : Graphics :: Fact : Opinion).
111. Id. at 559.
112. Id.
113. 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2006).
114. Id.
115. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 561 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
116. See generally Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010).
117. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 556 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
118. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
119. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
120. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 526–27 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 527 (1992)).
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Judge Clay’s dissent also distinguished Blagojevich and a similar
121
Supreme Court case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, because
the laws in those cases (both concerning video games) affirmatively limited
speech and concerned core speech (art and literature) rather than
122
commercial speech. In contrast, Judge Clay observed, the FDA’s graphic
warnings “serve as disclaimers to the public regarding the incontestable
123
health consequences of using tobacco.”
Judge Clay’s dissent thus did not quibble with the standard of review.
The point of departure was whether the graphic warnings satisfy even the
rational basis test of Zauderer, which again allows disclosures that are
124
“reasonably related to the State’s interest.” Judge Clay found that they
do not.
Judge Clay’s unease with graphic warnings is that they are both
unprecedented and subjectivewhich he contrasted with the textual
125
warnings, which are both precedented and objective. On the first
measure, he is correct: Graphic warnings are new. On the second, Judge
Clay’s reasoning underwhelms. For example, he objected to the “visceral
reaction” that graphic warnings are intended to evoke, arguing that the
government cannot “frighten consumers” or try to “flagrantly manipulate”
126
This, he argued, can undermine rational
their emotions.
127
decisionmaking, as if the decision to smoke is entirely rational. As Judge
Stranch wrote in retort: “Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an
emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but
128
that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”
Judge Clay also noted that “color graphics cannot accurately convey
129
all of the health risks associated with tobacco use,” as if that were
130
required to satisfy Zauderer. The Court in Zauderer, in fact, explicitly
rejected the idea that disclosures must “get at all facets of the
131
problem.” Judge Clay then objected that persons seeing the graphic

121. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
122. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 526–27 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 527.
124. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
125. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 528 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 529.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 569 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 530 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
130. For example, prescription drug labels also cannot convey all possible risks of a drug, even
though labels are somewhat comprehensive. See, e.g., Jon Duke et al., A Quantitative Analysis of
Adverse Events and “Overwarning” in Drug Labeling, 171 Archives Internal Med. 941 (2011)
(finding an average of almost seventy discrete adverse drug event warnings in each FDA-approved
prescription drug label).
131. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985) (“[W]e are
unpersuaded by [the] argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is ‘under-
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132

warnings might interpret them differently, as if textual warnings are not
similarly subject to interpretation. Finally, Judge Clay suggested that the
graphic warnings requirement “may rest on different individual viewpoints
133
and ideologies,” as if the health effects of smoking are ideological and
not proven.
Though Judge Clay acknowledged the low hurdle presented by
134
Zauderer, he found that the graphic warnings do not clear it. Thus, the
split opinion in the Sixth Circuit boils down not to the standard of review
(on which the majority and dissent agree), but to whether the government
has a rational basis for requiring graphic warnings under Zauderer.
B. The D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Graphic Warnings
Five months after the Sixth Circuit upheld graphic warnings, the D.C.
135
Circuit struck them down. It is worth noting two differences in scope.
First, the Sixth Circuit confronted many more questions on appeal than did
the D.C. Circuit. For example, does the requirement that the FDA
preapprove marketing for “modified risk” tobacco products (those
claiming to be “light,” “mild,” and the like) violate the First Amendment?
136
(No.) Does the prohibition against tobacco companies sponsoring
certain events, producing certain branded merchandise, and giving away
137
free samples violate their free speech rights? (No.) Does the Act violate
the speech rights of tobacco marketers by limiting their advertising to
138
black and white text? (Yes.) And does the Act’s restriction against
claims that tobacco products are safer or less harmful by virtue of FDA
139
regulation violate marketers’ First Amendment rights? (No.) The D.C.
Circuit was not presented with these issues on appeal.
Second, the Sixth Circuit treated this as a facial challenge, as the FDA
had not yet proposed its graphic warnings when the Western District of
140
Kentucky entered summary judgment for the government. In contrast,
the D.C. Circuit was able to address the actual graphic warnings selected
by the FDA, as the final rule was published two months before the
141
companies filed their complaint. This favored the government in the

inclusive’that is, if it does not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate.”).
132. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 530 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The color
graphics can be seen one way by some smokers, yet another by other smokersone way by some nonsmokers and yet an entirely different interpretation by other non-smokers.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
136. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 531–37 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 537–44.
138. Id. at 544–48.
139. Id. at 548–51.
140. Id. at 522; id. at 552–53 (Stranch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
141. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22,
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Sixth Circuit but favored the tobacco companies in the D.C. Circuit. This
142
difference allowed the government to argue that there is no circuit split.
Scope aside, there are parallels between the two decisions. Like the
143
Sixth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit divided 2–1, but against graphic warnings.
144
Judge Brown wrote for the majority, joined by Judge Randolph. Judge
145
Rogers wrote in dissent. Also, like the Sixth Circuit, the opinions spent
considerable time contemplating the proper standard of review.
Judge Brown’s majority opinion considered Zauderer at length but
found it inapt for several reasons. First, Zauderer governs disclosures
designed to address consumer deception, not those designed to
146
communicate health risks for which there seems to be no directly
controlling precedent. To Judge Brown, the FDA did not demonstrate that
147
consumers risk being deceived without graphic warnings. She discounted
arguments that the government designed the graphic warnings to counter
148
decades of deceptive tobacco marketing. On this point, the dissent cited
the D.C. Circuit’s own language in Pearson v. Shalala, which states that
“the government’s interest in preventing consumer fraud/confusion may
well take on added importance in the context of a product . . . that can
149
affect the public’s health.” Thus, both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits
struggled with whether Zauderer applies only when the state’s interest is
countering consumer deception, or if it also applies to other state interests.
Second, the D.C. Circuit majority held that Zauderer applies only to
150
“purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosures. Judge Brown found the
FDA’s graphic warnings to be neither. This part of the opinion is the most
strident because it aggressively second-guesses the policy judgments of
Congress and the FDA. For example, the image of a man exhaling smoke
through the tracheostomy hole in his throat must, to Judge Brown, portray
151
a “common consequence of smoking”; it may not symbolize “the
152
addictive nature” of it. The majority maintained that graphic warnings

2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
142. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 15, at 13.
143. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
144. Id. at 1208.
145. Id. at 1222 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1213 (majority).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1214–15.
149. Id. at 1235 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Pearson v. Shalala,
164 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
150. Id. at 1216 (majority).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,649 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141)). The government argues that this
phenomenon (smoking through one’s tracheostomy hole, even after cancer surgery) is not unusual. Id.
at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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cannot be purely factual if they are designed to evoke emotion or “shock
153
the viewer.” The majority also seemed to require that the images
154
themselves convey some information apart from the textual warnings.
But Congress directed the FDA to “require color graphics depicting the
negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the label
155
statements.” As the dissent noted, the graphics and text should be
156
viewed together as a single presentation, not separately. Finally, the
majority concluded that the images are “inflammatory” and represent
“unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and
157
browbeat consumers into quitting.”
Thus instead of Zauderer’s rational basis review, the majority applied
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, following two earlier D.C.
Circuit opinions addressing whether corrective advertising violates the
158
First Amendment.
159
In dissent, Judge Rogers argued that Zauderer should apply. In
Zauderer, she noted, the Supreme Court found that preventing consumer
deception is a sufficient government interest to justify mandatory
160
disclosures, but not the only government interest that could do so. She
also argued that although consumer deception is not necessary to invoke
Zauderer, it is present here because the tobacco industry has a history of
deceptive advertising that parallels the risk of deception in Zauderer
161
162
itself. Actual deception is not required—just the risk of it. Moreover,
the mandatory warning does not affirmatively limit the companies’ own
163
speech, as they claimed.
The Rogers dissent then considered whether the warnings were
164
factually accurate and non-controversial. She found the textual warnings
165
were factual. The question became whether the color images rendered
166
the warnings as a whole to be “nonfactual or controversial.” On this
153. Id. at 1216 (majority).
154. Id.
155. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(d), 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (emphasis added).
156. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1216–17 (majority).
158. Id. at 1217 (discussing both United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and
Novartis Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
159. Id. at 1223 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1227 n.6 (citing both the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985), and the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Discount Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th Cir. 2012)).
161. Id. at 1222, 1227 n.6.
162. Id. at 1227.
163. Id. at 1229 (citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010)).
164. Id. at 1229.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1230.
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point, the dissent invoked the common sense observation in Zauderer that
illustrations or pictures draw attention to and amplify the textual message
167
being communicated. Like the Sixth Circuit majority, the Rogers dissent
rebutted the logical fallacy that images cannot by their nature be factually
accurate.
The Rogers dissent also considered whether the specific images
selected by the FDA in its final rule were factual. The images, she
observed, “are, in fact, accurate depictions of the effects of sickness and
168
Just because the images may be
disease caused by smoking.”
discomforting or even disturbing to look at does not make them factually
169
inaccurate. As Rogers emphasized, “factually accurate, emotive, and
170
persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions.”
Still, this logic did not persuade a majority on the D.C. Circuit. As
such, the decision vacated the graphic warnings rule and remanded back
to the FDA.
C. The Government Withdraws
To many, the disparate court of appeals rulings presented a circuit
split that the Supreme Court would have to resolve. But in March 2013,
the FDA withdrew its graphic warnings rule and the Department of
Justice decided to forego Supreme Court review.
The FDA made no formal announcement of its decision. But a
March 15 letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Speaker of the
House John Boehner explained that the Department of Justice would
171
The
not petition the Supreme Court to review R.J. Reynolds.
government had petitioned the D.C. Circuit to rehear R.J. Reynolds en
172
banc, which the court denied.
But that is as far as the government would press. The Holder letter
emphasized that R.J. Reynolds invalidated only “the particular graphic
warnings adopted in FDA’s regulation” and that “FDA therefore remains
173
free to conduct new rulemaking.” The letter also explained “that FDA

167. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)).
168. Id. (quoting Cigarette Package & Adver. Warnings, 21 C.F.R. § 1141 (2012)).
169. Id. The one exception, according to the dissent, is the required disclosure of the National
Cancer Institute’s hotline, 1-800-QUIT-NOW, which “does not directly disclose factual information
about the health consequences of smoking.” Id. at 1234, 1236. Thus, the dissent analyzes this provision
under Central Hudson rather than Zauderer. Id. at 1236.
170. Id. at 1230.
171. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker of the House of
Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013) (on file with author).
172. Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d 1205
(Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063), 2012 WL 4844135, rehearing en banc denied, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063 (Dec. 5,
2012) (per curiam).
173. Letter from Eric Holder, supra note 171, at 3.
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will undertake research to support a new rulemaking consistent with the
174
Tobacco Control Act.” Thus, the letter continued, “the Solicitor General
has determined, after consultation with HHS and FDA, not to seek
Supreme Court review of the First Amendment issues at the present
175
time.” The paragraph concluded by noting that Supreme Court review
would be possible if “a court of appeals were to set aside new regulations
176
issued by FDA at a later date.”
Around the same time, the Solicitor General filed a brief in
opposition to the industry’s petition for certiorari, which is notable for a
few reasons. First, it emphasized that the Sixth Circuit’s decision upholding
177
the FDA’s authority under the Act to issue graphic warnings is correct.
Second, it argued that the case was moot because the D.C. Circuit vacated
the only remaining legal source that imposed graphic warnings (the FDA’s
rule) and because “the government has decided not to petition for
178
certiorari in Reynolds.” The Solicitor General’s brief also emphasized
that “the Act does not directly impose graphic warnings,” but instead
179
authorizes the FDA to promulgate regulations that require them. This
caveat appeared several times in the brief and was likely intended to
inoculate the statute from the First Amendment vulnerabilities of the
FDA’s rule.
Thus, the Attorney General’s letter and the Solicitor General’s brief
close the latest chapter in the long struggle to regulate tobacco. As it now
stands, the FDA will conduct research to support new rulemaking to
require graphic warnings that accompany the nine written warnings
imposed under the Tobacco Control Act. As we start a new chapter in
this saga, both the FDA and the industry (and eventually the courts) will
have to confront five lingering doctrinal ambiguities, which are discussed
in Part III.

III. Can the Government Fight for Our Hearts (and Minds)?
At stake in the next round of graphic warnings rulemaking and
litigation is the government’s ability to catch our attention at the point of
sale. Black-and-white textual warnings are frequently overlooked and
180
ignored, because consumers are inundated with such warnings and
have become numb to disclaimers and words of caution. How can the
government grab our attention? In the cacophony of advertisements,

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 15, at 13.
178. Id. at 13–14.
179. Id. at 16.
180. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to
Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 293, 374–78 (1994).
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messages, and marketing, how far can the government go to be heard?
And what can it do when it shares the same space (here, tobacco
packaging) with private companies?
First Amendment doctrine is largely silent on these questions. Indeed,
First Amendment doctrine says very little on the broader issue of
181
compelled commercial disclosures, despite their prevalence.
Yet as the FDA begins to consider new graphic warnings, and as it
contemplates inevitable judicial review, the agency will have to confront
these questions. This Article looks at five questions in particular that may
determine the fate of not just graphic tobacco warnings, but future graphic
warnings that the government could deem necessary: (i) What standard of
review applies to graphic warnings? (ii) Were the FDA’s graphic warnings
factual or factually controversial? (iii) Did the graphic warnings appeal to
rationality or emotion, and does this matter for First Amendment
purposes? (iv) Will the rights of marketers give way to the core value
animating commercial speech doctrine, which is to encourage more
speech, not less? Finally, (v) will a negative Supreme Court opinion
hamstring future government efforts to be heard?
A. The Standard of Review Battle
As noted above, whether graphic warnings are permissible under the
First Amendment depends largely on the standard of review applied. One
lingering question after Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds is whether
Zauderer only applies when the state interest is preventing consumer
deception or if other state interests could also qualify. A careful
examination of Zauderer suggests that the core principal animating
commercial speech doctrine is encouraging information to circulate, not
182
simply preventing deception. The government has many reasons for
circulating information: to minimize product safety hazards, health
hazards, or environmental hazards, to name a few. Preventing consumer
deception is just one reason why the government might need to circulate
information.
Applying Central Hudson rather than Zauderer based on the
specific state interest has little grounding. The D.C. Circuit is somewhat
of an outlier in applying Zauderer so narrowly. The First, Second, and
now the Sixth Circuits have applied Zauderer when the state interest is
183
something other than preventing consumer deception. Thus, although
181. Keighley, supra note 19, at 541.
182. Id. at 557–58; Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech
and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 555,
577 (2006).
183. For example, in addition to the Sixth Circuit, the First and Second Circuits both have applied
Zauderer to laws pursuing other state interests. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294,
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appellate courts are divided, they lean heavily in one direction.
Commercial speech restrictions governed by Central Hudson are
routinely justified by state interests other than preventing consumer
184
deception, even though the law in Central Hudson itself was predicated
on different grounds.
Another threshold question that was not given much attention by
either appellate court is whether the speech at issue is commercial or
noncommercial. Tobacco companies argued before the Sixth Circuit that
strict scrutiny should apply rather than the less demanding tests for
185
commercial speech. The D.C. Circuit considered the question, but only
186
briefly. Because the battleground here is tobacco packaging and
advertising rather than the pages of scientific journals or news wires, the
speech is most likely commercial.
When confronted with different kinds of speech by FDA-regulated
187
firms, courts have been quite uniform. Even with compelled disclosures,
there is a wide gap between attempts to “prescribe what shall be orthodox
188
in politics, nationalism, [or] religion” and attempts “to prescribe what
189
shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.” Although the Supreme
Court would have little reason in this case to probe the fine lines between
commercial and noncommercial speech, many are waiting for the Court to
do so eventually.
B. Fact or Controversy?
Another lingering ambiguity that the FDA and reviewing courts will
have to resolve is whether the FDA’s graphic tobacco warnings were
factual. Both Zauderer and Central Hudson address factual speech.
Zauderer speaks of mandatory disclosures that convey “purely factual and
190
uncontroversial information.” Central Hudson reaffirms that the First
191
Amendment protects commercial speech that is not false or “misleading.”
The two are mirror images: Zauderer addresses disclosures authored by
310 (1st Cir. 2005) (involving a state interest in ensuring access to high quality, cost-effective health
care); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving a state interest in
“protecting human health and the environment”).
184. Keighley, supra note 19, at 558–61.
185. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).
186. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see id. at 1226
(Rogers, J., dissenting).
187. See generally Cortez, supra note 20 (reviewing twenty-four cases in which FDA-regulated
firms claimed First Amendment protection since commercial speech was formally recognized in 1976,
and finding that all but two cases concluded that the speech was commercial rather than
noncommercial, with the other two cases not involving FDA rules or enforcement).
188. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
189. Id. at 651; see R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1226 n.5 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
190. 471 U.S. at 651.
191. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 566 (1980).
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the government, while Central Hudson addresses speech authored by
commercial interests. As such, both the Sixth and D.C. Circuits evaluated
not only how “factual” the graphic warnings are (or, in the Sixth Circuit,
can be), but also whether they respond to years of false or misleading
marketing by tobacco companies.
The veracity of the nine new textual warnings is entirely
192
noncontroversial; the tobacco companies do not seriously dispute them.
The question thus turns on whether the graphic images selected by the
FDA to “accompany” these textual warnings rendered them nonfactual
or at least factually controversial.
The D.C. Circuit majority tipped its hand when it framed the
question: “[H]ow much leeway should this Court grant the government
when it seeks to compel a product’s manufacturer to convey the state’s
subjectiveand perhaps even ideologicalview that consumers should
193
reject this otherwise legal, but disfavored, product?”
Richard Epstein echoed similar sentiments, calling the graphic
warnings “falsehoods” and even suggesting that the images themselves
were misleading unless they (somehow) communicated all of the other
factors that contribute to the health risks pictured actually materializing—
such as “the number of cigarettes smoked, their tar and nicotine content,
194
the level of inhalation, and the age at which smoking takes place.” It is
unrealistic to expect any single image to convey such a catalog of
clarifications without also turning it into a long, pharmaceutical-like
package insert (and perhaps inducing sleep). Moreover, as I note above,
the Supreme Court in Zauderer rejected the idea that a mandated
disclosure has to “get at all facets of the problem it is designed to
195
ameliorate.”
There is some sense, as Jennifer Keighley recommends, in
distinguishing “factual” speech that discloses facts about the world from
“normative” speech that urges the audience to do or not to do
196
something. For example, the text, “WARNING: Smoking can kill you”
seems much less problematic than the text, “WARNING: You should not
smoke because it can kill you.” The implication is clear in the first
message, but the second plods toward the “unduly burdensome”
197
disclosures contemplated by Zauderer.

192. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2012).
193. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212.
194. Richard A. Epstein, When Government Distorts the Truth, Defining Ideas (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/127086.
195. 471 U.S. at 651 n.14.
196. Keighley, supra note 19, at 569–70.
197. 471 U.S. at 651.
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Facially, both warnings convey similar messages. But the subtext
differs. “WARNING: Smoking can kill you” implies, “Smoke if you wish,
but know that it can kill you.” The government’s interest is to inform the
would-be smoker, though it leaves the ultimate decision to the individual.
The second statement implies nothing. “WARNING: You should not
smoke because it can kill you” means what it says. The government could
not claim that its interest merely is to inform. While the government
undoubtedly could urge people not to smoke in its own publications, it
might become “unduly burdensome” when the warnings are required on
tobacco packaging and advertisements. Carrying the government’s
normative message risks forcing the speaker to serve as the government’s
198
billboard.
But these examples involve text. Would adding graphics render the
warnings nonfactual or factually controversial? Take the statement,
“WARNING: Smoking can kill you,” accompanied by the picture of a
dead body with an autopsy scar along the chest. This warning is less
problematic (though much more disturbing and gripping) than the
statement, “WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious
risks to your health,” accompanied by a picture of a man wearing a t-shirt
with a “no smoking” symbol and the words “I QUIT.” The first image is
factual, if disturbing; the second image is normative, if mundane. Similarly,
199
the hotline number 1-800-QUIT-NOW is normative, not factual.
An image does not necessarily turn a factual message into a
normative one, as long as the image itself is factual and not misleading.
Thus the burden for compelled graphic warnings should be whether they
are false or misleading. The government can speak normatively in its
own publications, but compelled disclosures should be factual and not
misleading. This would be symmetrical with the commercial speech
doctrine governing speech restrictions, which recognizes that the First
Amendment does not protect false or misleading messages.
Consider the statement, “WARNING: Smoking can kill you,”
accompanied by the image of a dead body with an autopsy scar. Given
that smoking can, in fact, cause death, a body deceased from the
consequences of smoking is not misleading. It happens. As the dissent in
the D.C. Circuit observed:

198. Keighley, supra note 19, at 570 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)). Years
ago, the Administrative Conference of the United States considered whether agencies should
communicate risk information simply to inform and educate, or to change behavior. See Risk
Communication as a Regulatory Alternative for Protecting Health, Safety, and the Environment,
55 Fed. Reg. 13,538, 13,539 (proposed Apr. 11, 1990).
199. The hotline number is the one feature of the graphic warnings that the dissent in the D.C.
Circuit would have invalidated. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1234, 1236 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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The FDA might have opted for an image of a decaying cadaver or of a
pile of ashes to portray the likely physical consequences of smoking,
but it was not limited to such images in its representation of those
consequences. An autopsy scar is merely one way of communicating
that the man in the image is dead; viewed in connection with the
textual warning, the image conveys the message that smoking can
200
result in death.

The tobacco companies also objected to the image of a man exhaling
smoke through the tracheostomy hole in his throat, accompanied by the
201
text, “WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive.” By amplifying the textual
warning, the image undoubtedly does as it intends. But smoking through a
tracheostomy hole after cancer surgery is “not so extreme or unusual” as
202
to be nonfactual. As the government showed, “fifty percent of neck and
203
head cancer patients continue to smoke.” The image thus drives home a
fact: “Cigarettes are addictive.” That the image is particularly effective
should not render it unconstitutional.
Thus, if the next reviewing court decides that the graphic warnings
chosen by the FDA are factual rather than nonfactual or factually
controversial, then it should apply the rational basis test in Zauderer.
Otherwise, the graphic warnings must surmount a more searching review,
perhaps under Central Hudson or other similarly ill-fitting precedents.
A factual dispute also revolves around whether the graphic warnings
selected by the FDA were necessary to convey the true health risks of
smoking, which itself turns on whether consumers (particularly adolescents)
fully appreciate these risks. Both sides agreed that adolescents generally
204
overestimate the risk of developing cancer. Yet, research also suggests
that adolescents generally underestimate or misunderstand the other
health risks of tobacco use, including the long-term risks and the specific
205
risks to themselves.
Given the persistent number of smoking-related deaths each year
206
(around 400,000), we are faced with one of two possibilities: Either new
smokers generally are well aware of the health risks and make rational
decisions to smoke anyway, or new smokers discount the risks, perhaps
due to cognitive biases or a lack of adequate information (or a lack of
adequately memorable information). If the former is true, then graphic
207
warnings probably will not work. If the latter is true, they should. If the
200. Id. at 1232.
201. Id. at 1209 (majority).
202. Id. at 1231 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 525 (6th Cir. 2012).
205. Id.
206. Reuben, supra note 3, at 61.
207. Aside from the FDA’s consumer study, the other empirical evidence is largely comparative.
As noted by the D.C. Circuit, thirty-three countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Canada,
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answer is a mix of both, why should courts second-guess the judgment of
both Congress and the FDA, as long as the graphic warnings are neither
false nor misleading?
Either way, this represents another factual dispute between the
tobacco industry and two branches of government—the legislative and
executive. How much evidence should the third branch of the government
(the judicial) require from the other two? Should Congress have to prove
empirically that graphic warnings will indeed reduce smoking levels, or
even smoking deaths?
The D.C. Circuit engaged in a searching review of the evidence used
by the FDA to justify its final selection of images, even scrutinizing the
design of the FDA’s consumer study that attempted to measure the
208
effectiveness of the proposed warnings. The Sixth Circuit found support
in the Second Circuit’s National Electrical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell
decision that the government could rely on common sense intuitions that
209
larger, color graphics would have more force than black-and-white text.
Will courts expect hard empirical evidence that graphic warnings
will actually reduce smoking levels or smoking deaths? Will it require
empirical data showing that color images are more effective than blackand-white text? Or will it rely on common sense intuitions per Sorrell?
The FDA will have to consider this question as it conducts new research
to support another round of rulemaking.
C. Mind or Emotion?
Another fascinating (and perhaps irresolvable) issue hovering after
Discount Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds is whether graphic warnings
necessarily appeal to our emotions rather than to our minds—and
whether this matters for First Amendment purposes. Both appellate courts
divided on this question.
In his Sixth Circuit dissent, Judge Clay objected that graphic
warnings trigger a “visceral reaction” aimed to “frighten consumers” and
“flagrantly manipulate [their] emotions,” which can undermine rational
210
decisionmaking. Likewise, in her D.C. Circuit majority opinion, Judge

Chile, Colombia, Cook Islands, Djibouti, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jordan, Latvia, Malaysia,
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Singapore,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela) currently require
graphic warnings on tobacco packaging. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1209 n.3. Similar requirements are
pending in seven other countries: France, Guernsey, Honduras, Malta, Norway, the Philippines, and
Spain. Id. The D.C. Circuit majority in R.J. Reynolds was underwhelmed by the effects of graphic
warnings in other countries, although it admitted that confounding variables complicated the data. Id.
208. Id. at 1209–10.
209. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 555–58, 564 (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104,
115 (2d Cir. 2001), which upheld a Vermont statute requiring manufacturers of light bulbs containing
mercury to label them as such and to tell consumers to recycle or dispose of them as hazardous waste).
210. Id. at 528–29 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Brown argued that graphic warnings cannot be “purely factual” if they
211
are designed to “evoke emotion” or “shock the viewer.”
In contrast, Judge Stranch’s majority opinion for the Sixth Circuit
retorted: “Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response,
spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not
212
magically turn such facts into opinions.” Likewise, Judge Rogers’ dissent
in the D.C. Circuit stressed that even though the FDA’s graphic images
may be discomforting or disturbing, they were accurate depictions of the
213
effects of smoking. She observed that “factually accurate, emotive, and
214
persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions.”
Are visuals so persuasive that they “stop us from thinking,” as the
215
director Errol Morris once said? Research in the field of psychology
supports the commonsense observation that images grip people more
216
quickly and trigger their emotions more easily than text. Indeed, that is
why Congress chose to use images, following the example of forty other
countries that require graphic tobacco warnings or have such requirements
217
pending.
Critics argue that quicker, more intuitive reactions to images subvert
218
rational decisionmaking. Judge Richard Posner, after reviewing such
research, observed that emotion “short-circuits reason conceived of as a
conscious, articulate process of deliberation, calculation, analysis, or
219
reflection.”
Is this true, and does it matter for First Amendment purposes? As the
Sixth Circuit’s majority and the D.C. Circuit’s dissent observed, graphic
images do not magically transform facts into opinions. The demonstrated
health effects of smoking are disconcerting and disturbing. Should the
government be required to communicate these facts in the dullest possible
manner? As the D.C. Circuit’s dissent noted, this “argument leads to the
counterintuitive conclusion that the more concerning the negative health
effects of a particular product, the more constrained the government is in
220
mandating disclosures of those facts.” This cannot be the case.
211. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17.
212. Disc. Tobacco, 674 F.3d at 569.
213. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
214. Id.
215. Nadia N. Sawicki, Tobacco Labeling and the Ethics of Persuasion, Bill of Health Blog
(Sept. 11, 2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2012/09/11/tobacco-labeling-and-the-ethics-ofpersuasion (describing the “fear appeal” of some public health campaigns); see Michael Meyer, Errol
Morris on Abu Ghraib: An Interview with the Filmmaker, Colum. Journalism Rev. (Mar. 5, 2008, 2:40
PM), http://www.cjr.org/q_and_a/errol_morris_on_abu_ghraib.php.
216. Sawicki, supra note 215.
217. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1209 n.3.
218. Sawicki, supra note 215.
219. Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 228 (2001).
220. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1231.

June 2013]

GRAPHIC TOBACCO WARNINGS

1495

Moreover, is the decision to smoke a rational, calculated process? Is
it, as Judge Posner describes (with his characteristic law and economics
sensibilities), “a conscious, articulate process of deliberation, calculation,
221
analysis, or reflection”? If notor if the process is a more complicated
mix of reasoning and emotionthen why should the First Amendment
not allow factual warnings that touch both nerves? Again, the FDA will
have to consider these questions very carefully as it crafts new graphic
warnings.
D. “More Disclosure, Rather than Less”?
In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first articulated the thought
that the First Amendment enables a marketplace of ideas, in which speech
222
competes for attention based on its merits. But it was not until 1976 that
223
the Supreme Court formally recognized ideas in the marketplace. In the
now-famous case Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Court emphasized that the core concern in
protecting commercial speech under the First Amendment is to ensure
“the free flow of commercial information” so that consumers can make
224
decisions that are “intelligent and well informed.”
Since then, commercial speech doctrine has always been predicated
225
on the value of information to consumers. When evaluating government
restrictions on commercial speech, the Supreme Court has long reminded
us that “the preferred remedy [for false or misleading speech] is more
226
disclosure, rather than less.” In a 2012 concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy reiterated that the “remedy for speech that is false is speech that
227
is true.” The Court has recognized that consumers have a significant
228
interest in “receiving truthful information about tobacco products.” First
229
Amendment doctrine clearly prefers disclosure to suppression. That

221. Posner, supra note 219, at 228.
222. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).
223. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
224. Id. at 748. The Supreme Court invoked Alexander Meiklejohn, who was one of the most
notable proponents of free speech in the twentieth century. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn,
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
225. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
226. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (striking down a state bar rule prohibiting
price advertising by attorneys).
227. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001).
229. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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basic valuemore information, not lesslikely animates most mandatory
230
disclosure requirements.
Compelling factual disclosures in commerce is justified both on
economic grounds (correcting information asymmetries as a market
failure) and on democratic ones (enabling robust deliberation by an
231
informed citizenry). As the Court in Zauderer observed, the marketer’s
interest “in not providing any particular factual information in his
232
Commercial speech doctrine has always
advertising is minimal.”
preferred more speech to less. Graphic warnings support rather than
undermine this core tenet.
E. Implications for Other Disclosure Regimes
Engaging in commerce has long meant making certain disclosures
233
and bearing other informational costs of compliance. For example,
234
corporations have to disclose mountains of financial information.
Publicly traded firms must disclose any information “material” to
235
investors. New vehicles must disclose their gas mileage and safety
236
ratings. Products containing certain poisonous chemicals must be
237
labeled as poisonous. Food labels must include the food’s ingredients
and nutritional content, including unflattering things like total fat,
238
cholesterol, and sodium. Drug labels must include the most salient
239
health risks, which also tend to be unflattering (e.g., “Antidepressants
may increase suicidal thoughts or behaviors in some children, teenagers,
240
and young adults . . . .”). Hazardous materials must be labeled as such

230. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2000)
(“The Court has been quite explicit that commercial speech should be constitutionally protected so as
to safeguard the circulation of information.”).
231. Keighley, supra note 19, at 550–55 (summarizing the theoretical justifications for mandatory
disclosures).
232. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
233. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at *1340–41. For a
contemporary treatment of these disclosure regimes, see Archon Fung et al., Full Disclosure: The
Politics, Perils and Promise of Targeted Transparency (2007).
234. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs
of Disclosure, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 473 (2007) (describing the phalanx of mandatory financial disclosure
laws and how they can sometimes be counterproductive).
235. This requirement dates back to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2013).
236. 16 C.F.R. § 259.1 (2012); Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and
Documentation (TREAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 12, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
237. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1).
238. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2012).
239. 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.57(a)(10) (requiring a concise summary of clinically significant warnings and
precautions for prescription drugs); id. § 201.66(c)(5) (requiring certain salient warnings for over-thecounter drug labels).
240. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Abilify: Important Safety Information, Abilify, http://www.abilify.com
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241

and specify their risks. Home appliances must disclose how much
242
energy they consume. Toy packaging must recommend an appropriate
243
Pesticides must list their ingredients and include
age for use.
244
instructions on how to use them properly. Restaurant chains will soon
245
have to disclose the calories in their menu offerings, which could be a
frightening prospect to some. Health warnings have been required for
246
decades on alcohol products and, of course, tobacco products.
Many of these required disclosures are predicated on state interests
other than preventing consumer deception, like protecting the public
247
health, reducing environmental hazards, and ensuring product safety. If
these disclosures were thus not subject to rational basis review under
Zauderer, but instead to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny, would
248
they survive? These disclosure regimes enjoy widespread acceptance.
As Keighley observes, the common theme among these disclosure
requirements is that they seem to be “motivated by the state’s interest in
249
a more informed public.” And again, the government might have a
substantial interest in informing the public for several predicate reasons.
Subjecting disclosures aimed at public health and safety to more scrutiny
than disclosures aimed to address consumer deception would, perversely,
250
flip these priorities.
But, one might counter, graphic warnings are different: Textual
warnings are old and accepted and some are even hoary by now. Graphic
warnings are novel and differ from textual warnings in type, not just
degree. They need not. As long as graphic warnings are factualrather
than non-factual, factually controversial, or normativethen they should
be subject to rational basis review under Zauderer, which governs
compelled commercial disclosures.
Still, a later Supreme Court decision on the FDA’s graphic warnings
would implicate potential future disclosure regimes rather than the ones
just described. A decision striking down the first serious attempt to catch
our attention at the point of sale with graphics, rather than words, would

(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p).
242. 16 C.F.R. § 305.11 (2012).
243. Id. § 1501.2.
244. 40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (2012).
245. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
246. 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2012).
247. Keighley, supra note 19, at 563–65.
248. Id. at 564–65.
249. Id. at 564 (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2006)).
250. Id. at 566. State laws requiring women seeking abortions to view ultrasounds of the fetus
before finalizing their decision are often compared to the FDA’s graphic warnings. See, e.g., Sawicki,
supra note 215. Although both represent novel efforts to persuade, the state ultrasound laws obviously
concern noncommercial speech.
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suspend mandatory disclosure laws in time and thereby hamstring future
efforts. This is troubling for several reasons.
Textual consumer product warnings are becoming more and more
251
stale and ineffective. First, they are probably overused. As Lars Noah
observed almost twenty years ago, the “proliferation of warnings may dilute
252
the impact of truly important cautionary information.” The FDA, in fact,
has long recognized the need to resist diluting its warnings and overloading
253
Other agencies have recognized the
consumers with information.
254
255
problem too. Media often mock our propensity to overwarn. Second,
many widely accepted disclosure requirements are demonstrated to be
ineffective. For example, many physicians disregard the warnings in
pharmaceutical labels, even so-called “black box” warnings required for
256
the most severe risks. In fact, the FDA has “openly chastised physicians
for disregarding instructions in the labeling for newly approved drugs,”
and has turned to more aggressive mechanisms like requiring risk
257
Likewise, in 2007, the Institute of Medicine
management plans.
concluded that cigarette warnings, last updated in 1984, had become stale
258
and ineffective. Most smokers know that smoking presents risks, but
they see these risks as remote and hypothetical and fail to appreciate their
259
own personal risks.
What happens when the government determines that a bland, blackand-white textual warning is being ignored? Should the government not

251. To the government, warnings are frequently seen as low-cost interventions. The incentives
created by product liability litigation contributes to over-warning. Noah, supra note 180, at 374–78.
252. Id. at 374.
253. Id. at 381.
254. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 58 Fed. Reg.
46,551, 46,554 (Sept. 2, 1993) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585); Choking Hazards Associated
with Toys and Articles Intended for Children Three Years of Age and Older; Withdrawal of Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed. Reg. 8013, 8015 (proposed Feb. 11, 1993); Noah, supra note
180, at 374–85.
255. See, e.g., Peter Carlson, Hey, Don’t Say They Didn’t Warn You . . ., Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 2006,
at C1.
256. See, e.g., Karen E. Lasser, Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for
Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215 (2002) (finding that during 2002, 33,778 patients were
prescribed drugs with special “black box” warnings, but 2354 prescriptions were written for uses that
directly contravened those warnings); Thomas J. Moore et al., Time to Act on Drug Safety, 279 JAMA
1571, 1572 (1998) (finding similarly ineffective an effort to warn patients about the addictive properties
of the drug propoxyphene); Walter Smalley et al., Contraindicated Use of Cisapride: Impact of Food
and Drug Administration Regulatory Action, 284 JAMA 3036 (2000) (finding warnings about a lifethreatening condition caused by a particular drug “had no material effect on” the product’s use).
257. Lars Noah, Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology: Cases and Materials 312–13 (3d
ed. 2012).
258. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,530
(proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
259. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628, 36,632
(June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
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be able to respond with more effective messaging techniques, including
the use of colors and images? Are warnings to remain forever impotent?
If the government cannot use graphics to warn about the risks of tobacco
usefor decades perhaps our biggest public health problemthen what
would ever justify graphic warnings for less urgent problems? For
example, could the government use graphics to convey the health risks of
eating fast food? Or texting while driving? Or using handguns? And
would these messages be viewed at all if not at the point of purchase?
Of course, even if courts again invalidated the FDA’s graphic
tobacco warnings, this would not automatically preclude other graphic
warnings. As Zauderer and Central Hudson anticipate, commercial speech
regulation is a matter of degree. Courts have always had trouble policing
the line between permissible and impermissible restrictions on commercial
speech. For example, how large can a graphic warning be? If occupying
fifty percent of the front and back labels goes too far, what about forty-five
percent? Or forty percent? If color images overwhelm our senses, what
about monochromatic ones? If the image of a dead body violates tobacco
companies’ First Amendment rights, how else might the government
communicate that “smoking can cause death,” without relying solely on
text? Surely there must be a way.
These are judgment calls that should draw deference from courts.
Indeed, in Zauderer itself, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the
argument that mandatory disclosures must be subject to a “least restrictive
260
means” analysis. We should encourage our democratically elected
representatives to experiment with disclosure methods that actually
workmeaning they are actually seen and digested rather than ignored.
As long as the required disclosures are not themselves false, misleading, or
normative, then marketers should have little First Amendment protection
from making factual disclosures about their products or services.

Conclusion
In 2009, Congress made a policy judgment that after two-hundred
years of non-regulation and another four decades of partial oversight,
tobacco products should have to disclose their true health risks in a
meaningful way at the point of sale. This policy judgment was challenged
on First Amendment grounds, and the challenge was sustained by the D.C.
Circuit. But a law that generates more effective information does not run
counter to the First Amendment—particularly the commercial speech
variant—it supports it.
Tobacco companies spend billions of dollars each year persuading
consumers to buy their productsin both subtle and not-so-subtle ways,
and by appealing both to our minds and our emotions. Our two elected
260. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 n.14 (1985).
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branches, in full view of the public, chose to empower the FDA to join this
fight. Will courts relegate the FDA (and future regulators of unforeseen
problems) to the sidelines? Will courts force the government to bring “a
261
butter knife to a gun fight”? It is not difficult to envision countless
government disclosure requirements that are relatively impotent and would
thus benefit from graphic makeovers. The judicial branch should let the
legislative and executive branches experiment with disclosure requirements
that actually work.
In the meantime, the FDA might be forced to choose between
graphic disclosures that actually work and blander, more ineffectual ones
that do not offend R.J. Reynolds. But as this Article argues, First
Amendment doctrine provides ample room for the FDA to use effective
graphic warnings.

261. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

